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Abstract
Inspired by real world examples, e.g. the Internet, researchers have introduced an abundance
of strategic games to study natural phenomena in networks. Unfortunately, almost all
of these games have the conceptual drawback of being computationally intractable, i.e.
computing a best response strategy or checking if an equilibrium is reached is NP-hard.
Thus, a main challenge in the field is to find tractable realistic network formation models.
We address this challenge by investigating a very recently introduced model by Goyal et
al. [WINE’16] which focuses on robust networks in the presence of a strong adversary who
attacks (and kills) nodes in the network and lets this attack spread virus-like to neighboring
nodes and their neighbors. Our main result is to establish that this natural model is one of
the few exceptions which are both realistic and computationally tractable. In particular, we
answer an open question of Goyal et al. by providing an efficient algorithm for computing
a best response strategy, which implies that deciding whether the game has reached a Nash
equilibrium can be done efficiently as well. Our algorithm essentially solves the problem
of computing a minimal connection to a network which maximizes the reachability while
hedging against severe attacks on the network infrastructure and may thus be of independent
interest.
1 Introduction
Many of today’s important networks, most prominently the Internet, are essentially the outcome
of an unsupervised decentralized network formation process among many selfish entities [22]. In
the case of the Internet these selfish entities are Autonomous Systems (AS) which interconnect
via peering agreements and thereby create a connected network of networks. Each AS can be
understood as a selfish player who strategically chooses a subset of other ASs to directly connect
with. Each inter-AS-connection is costly and yields a benefit and a risk. The benefit is a reliable
direct link towards the other AS. However, such a connection may be used by malicious software
and thus harbors the risk of collateral damage if a neighboring AS is attacked.
The field of strategic network formation, started by the seminal works of Jackson & Wolin-
sky [15], Bala & Goyal [2] and Fabrikant et al. [11], studies the global structure and properties
of networks formed by individual players making decentralized local strategic choices. In all
considered models there are players trying to optimize their own benefit, while minimizing their
individual cost. It is far from obvious why a collection of individual selfish strategies eventually
results in useful and reliable network topologies like the Internet. Studying the properties of
such models aims for revealing insights about properties of existing naturally grown networks
and inspiring methods to improve them.
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Required features of any Internet-like communication network are reachability and robust-
ness. Such networks have to ensure that even in case of cascading edge or node failures caused
by technical defects or malicious attacks, e.g. DDoS-attacks or viruses, most participating
nodes can still communicate. This important focus on network robustness has long been ne-
glected and is now a very recent endeavor in the strategic network formation community, see
e.g. [6, 14, 17, 20]. We contribute to this endeavor by proving that the very recently introduced
natural model by Goyal et al. [13, 14] is one of the few exceptions of a tractable network forma-
tion model. In particular, we provide an efficient algorithm for computing a utility maximizing
strategy for their elegant model, which can be used to efficiently decide whether a network is in
Nash equilibrium. Thus, our algorithm allows the model of Goyal et al. to be used to predict
real world phenomena in large scale simulations and to analyze real world networks. Moreover,
predicted structural properties of equilibria, which are obtained by a tractable model, are more
plausible since it can be assumed that computationally bounded agents in the real world will
eventually end up in an equilibrium state or at least close to it.
1.1 Related Work
We focus on the model for strategic network formation with attack and immunization recently
proposed by Goyal et al. [13, 14]. This model essentially augments the well-known reachability
model by Bala & Goyal [2] with robustness considerations. In particular, different types of
adversaries are introduced which attack (and destroy) a node of the network. This attack then
spreads virus-like to neighboring nodes and destroys them as well. Besides deciding which links
to form, players also decide whether they want to buy immunization against eventual attacks.
The model is the first model which incorporates network formation and immunization decisions
at the same time.
On the one hand, the authors of [13, 14] provide beautiful structural results for their model.
For example, showing that equilibrium networks are much more diverse than in the non-robust
version, proving that the amount of edge overbuilding due to robustness concerns is small and
establishing that equilibrium networks generally achieve very high social welfare. On the other
hand, the authors raise the intriguing open problem of settling the complexity of computing a
best response strategy in their model1.
Computing a best response in network formation games can be done in polynomial time for
the non-robust reachability model [2] and if the allowed strategy changes are very simple [19].
However, these examples are exceptions. The existence of an efficient best response algorithm
for a network formation game is in general a rare gem. For almost all related network formation
models, e.g. [4–6, 8, 10, 11, 21], where players strive for a central position in the network, it
has been shown that the problem is indeed NP-hard.
To the best of our knowledge, besides the model by Goyal et al. [13, 14] there are only a few
other models which combine selfish network formation with robustness considerations and all
of them consider a much weaker adversary which can only destroy a single edge. The earliest
are models by Bala & Goyal [3] and Kliemann [17], both essentially augment the model by
Bala & Goyal [2] with single edge failures. Other related models are by Meirom et al. [20] and
Chauhan et al. [6]. Both latter models consider players who try to be as central as possible
in the created networks but at the same time want to protect themselves against single edge
failures. In [20] heterogeneous players are considered whereas in [6] all players are homogeneous.
The complexity status for computing a best response was only settled for the model by Chauhan
et al. [6] where this problem was proven to be NP-hard.
Apart from network formation games, also vaccination games, e.g. [1, 7, 18, 23], are related.
1This question was raised in [13] for the maximum carnage adversary and is replaced in [14] with a reference
to our preprint of the present paper. The preprint also appeared as a Brief Announcement [12]
2
There the network is fixed and the selfish nodes only have to decide if the want to immunize or
not. Computing a best response in these models is trivial (there are only two strategies) but
pure Nash equilibria may not exist.
1.2 Our Contribution
We establish that the natural model by Goyal et al. [13, 14] is one of the few examples of a
tractable realistic model for strategic network formation and thereby answer an open question
by these authors. In particular, we provide an efficient algorithm for computing a best response
strategy for their main model, i.e. the “maximum carnage” adversary which tries to kill as
many nodes as possible, and for the natural variant which employs the even stronger random
attack adversary. Moreover, we employ our algorithm in empirical simulations which augment
the extensive simulations presented in [13, 14], where players were allowed to perform only
heavily restricted strategy changes. We observe fast and reliable convergence, despite the fact
that the authors of [13, 14] have shown that best response dynamics can cycle, a phenomenon
also observed in other network formation games [16].
1.3 Organization of the Paper
In Section 2 we introduce the model by Goyal et al. [13, 14] and some additional definitions and
notation. Our main contribution follows in Section 3, where we introduce the main ideas and a
detailed description of our algorithm. Several subroutines are used and we first show how these
subroutines work together to solve the main problem. After providing the big picture, we then
supply the subroutines with all details and correctness proofs separately.
We demonstrate the behavior of our algorithm experimentally in Section 3.7. Moreover, in
Section 4, we consider the random attack adversary which is less predictable than the maximum
carnage adversary. There we show how to adapt our algorithm with a few minor tweaks to cope
with this more complex scenario. We conclude in Section 5 where we discuss possible future
research directions.
2 Model
We work with the strategic network formation model proposed by Goyal et al. [13, 14] and mostly
use their notation. In this model the n nodes of a network G = (V,E) correspond to individual
players v1, . . . , vn. We will thus use the terms node, vertex and player interchangeably. The
edge set E is determined by the players’ strategic behavior as follows. Each player vi ∈ V can
decide to buy undirected edges to a subset of other players, paying α > 0 per edge, where α is
some fixed parameter of the model.
If player vi decides to buy the edge to node vj , then we say that the edge {vi, vj} is owned
and paid for by player vi.
2 Buying an undirected edge entails connectivity benefits and risks
for both participating endpoints. In order to cope with these risks, each player can also decide
to buy immunization against attacks at a cost of β > 0, which is also a fixed parameter of the
model. We call a player immunized if this player decides to buy immunization, and vulnerable
otherwise.
The strategy si = (xi, yi) of player vi consists of the set xi ⊆ V \{vi} of the nodes to buy an
edge to, and the immunization choice yi ∈ {0, 1}, where yi = 1 if and only if player vi decides to
2If both players vi and vj decide to buy the edge {vi, vj}, then this results in a multi-edge between vi and
vj . However, it is easy to see that best response strategies will never contain multi-edges which is why we ignore
them completely.
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immunize. The strategy profile s = (s1, . . . , sn) of all players then induces an undirected graph
G(s) =
V, ⋃
vi∈V
⋃
vj∈xi
{vi, vj}
 .
The immunization choices y1, . . . , yn in s partition V into the set of immunized players I ⊆ V
and vulnerable players U = V \ I. The components in the induced subgraph G[U ] are called
vulnerable regions and the set of those regions will be denoted by RU . The vulnerable region of
any vulnerable player vi ∈ U is RU (vi). Immunized regions RI are defined analogously as the
components of the induced subgraph G[I].
After the network G(s) is built, we assume that an adversary attacks one vulnerable player
according to a strategy known to the players. We consider mostly the maximum carnage adver-
sary [13, 14] which tries to destroy as many nodes of the network as possible. To achieve this,
the adversary chooses a vulnerable region of maximum size and attacks some player in that
region. If there is more than one such region with maximum size, then one of them is chosen
uniformly at random. If a vulnerable player vi is attacked, then vi will be destroyed and the at-
tack spreads to all vulnerable neighbors of vi, eventually destroying all players in vi’s vulnerable
region RU (vi). Let tmax = maxR∈RU{|R|} be the number of nodes in the vulnerable region of
maximum size and T = {vi ∈ U | |RU (vi)| = tmax} is the corresponding set of nodes which may
be targeted by the adversary. The set of targeted regions is RT = {R ∈ RU | |R| = tmax}, and
RT (vi) is the targeted region of a player vi ∈ T . Thus, if vi ∈ T is attacked, then all players in
the region RT (vi) will be destroyed.
The utility of a player vi in network G(s) is defined as the expected number of nodes
reachable by vi after the adversarial attack on network G(s) (zero in case vi was destroyed)
less vi’s expenditures for buying edges and immunization. More formally, let CCi(t) be the
connected component of vi after an attack to node vt ∈ T and let |CCi(t)| denote its number
of nodes. Then the utility (or profit) ui(s) of vi in the strategy profile s is
ui(s) =
1
|T |
(∑
vt∈T
|CCi(t)|
)
− |xi| · α− yi · β.
Fixing the strategies of all other players, the best response of a player vi is a strategy s
∗
i = (x
∗
i , y
∗
i )
which maximizes vi’s utility ui
(
(s1, . . . , si−1, s∗i , si+1, . . . , sn)
)
. We will call the strategy change
to s∗i a best response for player vi in the network G(s), if changing from strategy si ∈ s to
strategy s∗i is the best possible strategy for player vi if no other player changes her strategy.
Consider what happens if we remove node vi from the network G(s) = (V,E) and we call the
obtained network G(s) \ vi. In this case, G(s) \ vi consists of connected components C1, . . . , C`.
The edge-set x∗i can thus be partitioned into ` subsets x
∗
i (C1), . . . , x
∗
i (C`), where x
∗
i (Cz) denotes
the set of nodes in Cz to which vi buys an edge under best response strategy s
∗
i . We will say
that x∗i (Cz) is an optimal partner set for component Cz. Therefore, x
∗
i is the union of optimal
partner sets for all connected components in G(s) \ vi.
A best response is calculated for one arbitrary but fixed player va, which we call the active
player. Furthermore let C be the set of connected components which exist in G(s) \ va. Let
CU = {C ∈ C | C ∩ I = ∅},
CI = C \ CU ,
Cinc = {C ∈ C | ∃u ∈ C : {u, v} ∈ E},
where CU is the set of components in which all vertices are vulnerable, CI is the set of components
which contain at least one immunized vertex and Cinc is the set of components to which player
va is connected through incoming edges bought by some other player.
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3 The Best Response Algorithm
A naive approach to calculate the best response for player va would consider all 2
n possible
strategies and select one that yields the best utility. This is clearly infeasible for a larger
number of players.
3.1 Key Observations
Our algorithm exploits three observations to reduce the complexity from exponential to poly-
nomial:
Observation 1: The network G(s) \ va may consist of ` connected components that can be
dealt with independently for most decisions. As long as the set of possible targets of the adver-
sary does not change, the best response of va can be constructed by first choosing components
to which a connection is profitable and then choosing for each of those components an optimal
set of nodes within the respective component to build edges to.
Observation 2: Homogeneous components in G(s)\va, which consist of only vulnerable or
only immunized nodes, provide the same benefit no matter whether va connects to them with
one or with more than one edge. Thus the connection decision is a binary decision for those
components.
Observation 3: Mixed components in G(s)\va, which contain both immunized and vulner-
able nodes, consist of homogeneous regions that again have the property that at most one edge
per homogeneous region can be profitable. Merging those regions into block nodes forms an
auxilliary tree, called Meta Tree, which we use in an efficient dynamic programming algorithm
to compute the most profitable subset of regions to connect with.
Using the above observations, we construct an algorithm with a worst-case run time com-
plexity of O(n4 + k5) where n is the number of nodes of the network and k the number of block
nodes in the largest Meta Tree.
3.2 Main Algorithm
In this section, we introduce our main algorithm, called BestResponseComputation. Its
pseudo code can be found in Algorithm 1 and a schematic overview is depicted in Fig. 1.
Our algorithm solves the problem of finding a best response strategy by considering both
options of buying or not buying immunization and computing for both cases the best possible
set of edges to buy. Thus, the first step of BestResponseComputation is to drop the current
strategy of the active player va and to replace it with the empty strategy s∅ = (∅, 0) in which
player va does not buy any edge and does not buy immunization. Then the resulting strategy
profile s′ = (s1, . . . , sa−1, s∅, sa+1, . . . , sn) and the set of connected components CU and CI with
respect to network G(s′) \ va is considered.
The subroutine SubsetSelect, which is described in Section 3.4.1, determines the optimal
sets of components of CU to connect to if va does not immunize. This is done by solving an
adjusted Knapsack problem which involes only small numbers. Two such sets of components,
called At and Av, are computed depending on player va becoming targeted or not by connect-
ing to these components. Additionally the subroutine GreedySelect, which is described in
Section 3.4.2, computes a best possible subset of components of CU to connect with in case va
buys immunization by greedily connecting to all components in CU that are profitable.
The challenging part of the problem is to cope with the connected components in CI which
also contain immunized nodes. For such components our algorithm detects and merges equiva-
lent nodes and thereby simplifies these components to an auxiliary tree structure, which we call
the Meta Tree. This tree is then used in a dynamic programming fashion to efficiently compute
the best possible set of edges to buy towards nodes within the respective component. Thus,
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current strategy
s∅
SubsetSelect GreedySelect
At Av Ag
PartnerSetSelect
uˆ(C | ∅) uˆ(C | {w}) MetaTreeConstruct
MetaTreeSelect
uˆ(C | opt(r1)) . . . uˆ(C | opt(r`))
PossibleStrategy
drop current strategy
select partners
from CU \ Cinc
distinguish 3 cases to
fix T and RU (va)
repeat for each
Cj ∈ CI
brute force
0/1 edges
try each leaf as root, run DP algo-
rithm and choose the best solution
with ≥ 2 edges
BestResponseComputation
Figure 1: Schematic overview of the best response algorithm.
our approach for handling components containing immunized nodes can be understood as first
performing a data-reduction similar to many approaches for kernelization in the realm of Pa-
rameterized Algorithmics [9] and then solving the reduced problem via dynamic programming.
Algorithm 1: BestResponseComputation
Input: Strategies s = (s1, . . . , sn), Player va, 1 ≤ a ≤ n
Output: Best response strategy of player va denoted by sa = (xa, ya)
1 s∅ = (∅, 0);
2 Let G(s′) be the induced game state with s′ = (s1, . . . , sa−1, s∅, sa+1, . . . , sn);
3 Let At,Av be the solutions of SubsetSelect on CU ;
4 Let Ag be the solution of GreedySelect on CU ;
5 st = PossibleStrategy(At, 0);
6 sv = PossibleStrategy(Av, 0);
7 sg = PossibleStrategy(Ag, 1);
8 S = {s∅, st, sv, sg};
9 return strategy s ∈ S which maximizes va’s utility;
The subroutine PossibleStrategy, see Algorithm 2, obtains the best set of nodes in
components in CI . As this set depends on the number of targeted regions, it has to be determined
for several cases independently. These cases are va not being immunized and not being targeted,
va not being immunized but being targeted, and va being immunized. For each case, the
subroutine PossibleStrategy first chooses an arbitrary single edge to buy into the previously
selected components from CU .
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Algorithm 2: PossibleStrategy(A, ya)
Output: Best strategy with single edges to components in A, given immunization ya
1 M := ∅;
2 foreach C ∈ A do
3 M = M ∪ vi for an arbitrary node vi ∈ C;
4 Locally, add edges to nodes in M , update RI ,RU ,RT according to ya and M ;
5 B ← ∅;
6 foreach component C ∈ CI do
7 B ← B ∪ PartnerSetSelect(C)
8 return (M ∪B, ya);
Then the best set of edges to buy into components in CI is computed independently for each com-
ponent C ∈ CI via the subroutines PartnerSetSelect (see Section 3.5.1), MetaTreeCon-
struct (see Section 3.5.2) and MetaTreeSelect (see Section 3.5.4). The union of the ob-
tained sets is then returned. Finally, the algorithm compares the empty strategy and the
individually obtained best possible strategies for the above mentioned cases and selects the one
which maximizes player va’s utility.
We establish that all the mentioned subroutines work together as desired in Section 3.3. We
specify the constructed Meta Tree in Section 3.5.2 and the MetaTreeSelect algorithm in
Section 3.5.4.
The run time of our best response algorithm heavily depends on the size of the largest
obtained Meta Tree and we achieve a worst-case run time of O(n4 + k5) for the maximum
carnage adversary and O(n4 + nk5) for the random attack adversary, where n is the number of
nodes in the network and k is the number of blocks in the largest Meta Tree (See Section 3.6
and Section 4). In the worst case, this yields a run time of O(n5) and O(n6), respectively. To
contrast this worst-case bound, we also provide empirical results in Section 3.7 showing that
k is usually much smaller than n, which emphasizes the effectiveness of our data-reduction
and thereby shows that our algorithm is expected to be much faster than the worst-case upper
bound.
3.3 Correctness of PossibleStrategy and BestResponseComputation
We now prove the correctness of PossibleStrategy and BestResponseComputation un-
der the assumption that the subroutines SubsetSelect, GreedySelect and PartnerSet-
Select are correct.
It is important to note, that PartnerSetSelect will not only return a best set of edges
to buy into a component C ∈ CI but that all these edges connect to immunized nodes (see
Lemma 5). Thus, these edges do not change the set of targeted nodes T or player va’s vulnerable
region RU (va).
We start with proving the correctness of subroutine PossibleStrategy. This subroutine
gets a set of components from CU as input and then chooses an arbitrary node from each
component to buy an edge to. First, we show that this is correct.
Lemma 1. Buying at most one edge into any component C ∈ CU yields maximum profit for
player va.
Proof. Observe that in the case of an attack on component C it is destroyed completely, if the
attack takes place elsewhere C stays connected. Hence, a single edge to any player in C provides
connectivity to all surviving players in C in all cases, more edges therefore would only increase
expenses but not connectivity.
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Thus, the optimal choice of edges into components in CU only depends on the right choice of
the components by SubsetSelect and GreedySelect.
For components in CI we assume that PartnerSetSelect is correct and that buying
edges into components in CI do not change T or RU (va). We therefore only have to prove that
under this assumption it is indeed correct to handle all components in CI independently. For
establishing this result, we first have to define player va’s expected profit contribution of a single
component C ∈ CI .
3.3.1 Calculation of the Expected Profit Contribution of a Single Component
Assume that the adversary attacks vertex t. In this case, by abusing notation, let CCva(t) ∩ C
denote the set of nodes in component C that are still connected to player va after the attack
on vertex t and therefore contribute to va’s profit. In order to compute the expected profit
contribution of a component C ∈ CI for player va, we simply have to take the expectation of
|CCva(t) ∩ C| over all possible choices for an attack.
Let uˆva(C | ∆) be the profit contribution for player va of a component C ∈ CI if va buys
edges to all nodes in the set ∆. Thus,
uˆva(C | ∆) =
1
|T |
∑
t∈T
|CCva(t) ∩ C| − α|∆|.
3.3.2 Conditional Independence within CI
We proceed to proving that handling components in CI independently is indeed correct.
Lemma 2. Player va can deal with distinct components from CI independently, if T and RU (va)
do not change.
Proof. Recall that
uva(s) =
1
T
∑
t∈T
|CCva(t)| − |xa|α− yaβ.
Every summand can be split according to the components that player v can buy edges to. Let
∆C be the edges va buys into C. Then
uva(s) =
1
T
∑
t∈T
( ∑
C∈CI
(|CCva(t) ∩ C| − |∆C |α)
+
∑
C∈CU
(|CCva(t) ∩ C| − |∆C |α))− yaβ.
This can be written as
uva(s) =
∑
C∈CI
(
1
T
∑
t∈T
∣∣CCva(t) ∩ C∣∣− |∆C |α
)
+
1
T
∑
t∈T
∑
C∈CU
(∣∣CCva(t) ∩ C∣∣− |∆C |α)
− yaβ
=
∑
C∈CI
uˆva(C | ∆C)
+
1
T
∑
t∈T
∑
C∈CU
(∣∣CCva(t) ∩ C∣∣− |∆C |α)
− yaβ︸ ︷︷ ︸
(∗∗)
,
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using linearity of expectation and the definition of uˆ. Since both T and RU (va) remain un-
changed, (∗∗) is fixed.
The choice of nodes to connect to within any component C does not influence va’s con-
nectivity to nodes outside of C as every path from some node in C to some node outside C
traverses node va. Thus, the choice of nodes in C is independent from the choice of nodes in
other components. Hence, the first summation’s terms are independent.
Because every term is non-negative, the summands may be maximized independently of each
other to find the best response.
Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 directly yield the following:
Corollary 1. If PartnerSetSelect is correct and selects only edges to immunized nodes,
then PossibleStrategy is correct.
3.3.3 Correctness of BestResponseComputation
Now we show that the main subroutines work together as desired.
Theorem 1. If the algorithms SubsetSelect, GreedySelect and PossibleStrategy are
correct, then BestResponseComputation is correct.
Proof. We assume that PossibleStrategy computes an optimal set of edges into components
in CI and that all those edges connect to immunized nodes.
Firstly, observe that if va decides to immunize, then the player cannot change T orRU (va) by
buying edges. Moreover, in this case GreedySelect computes the optimal set of components
in CU to connect with via a single edge. Thus, strategy sg (see Alg. 1) is indeed a best possible
strategy for this case.
The only changes to T or RU (va) can happen in case va is vulnerable and buys edges to one
or more vulnerable nodes. After va’s edge purchases we distinguish the following cases:
Case 1: The new vulnerable region of va is strictly smaller than tmax: The set of targeted
nodes T does not change and va remains un-targeted. By assumption SubsetSelect has
chosen the optimal set of components Av from CU and thus strategy sv (see Alg. 1) is the best
strategy in this case.
Case 2: The new vulnerable region of va has the size of exactly tmax: This increases the
number of targeted nodes |T | by tmax as va becomes targeted. By assumption SubsetSelect
has chosen the optimal set of components At from CU and thus strategy st (see Alg. 1) is the
best strategy in this case.
Case 3: The new vulnerable region of va is larger than tmax: In this case va will be part
of the single largest vulnerable region and thus killed. Clearly, in this case the only and best
strategy for va is to not buy any edges.
Thus, BestResponseComputation covers all relevant cases and is therefore correct.
3.4 Subroutines Dealing with Components in CU
Components in CU are handled by the algorithms SubsetSelect and GreedySelect. The
details of these algorithms are specified in this section.
3.4.1 SubsetSelect: Interdependent Subset Selection of CU
We assume, the best response of va does not include immunization. By Lemma 1 we know
that the problem of finding optimal edge endpoints in components in CU is equivalent to the
problem of finding a subset of components in CU that is most profitable. In particular, it cannot
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be beneficial for va to buy edges to components from CU ∩ Cinc, as she is already connected to
those. Thus, CU \ Cinc = {C1, . . . , Cm} are the vulnerable components va might buy an edge to.
The algorithm SubsetSelect computes the subset of the set of components {C1, . . . , Cm}
which later yields the highest utility, by solving an adjusted Knapsack problem with |Ci| as
profit and the total number of connected nodes and the total number of newly built edges as
weight limits.
In the following, let M be a 3-dimensional table, where a cell M [x, y, z] of the table stores
the maximum number smaller or equal to z of nodes that player va can connect to, using
only components from {C1, . . . , Cx} and building at most y edges in total. As we only buy
a maximum of one edge per component, the dimensions of M are n × m × n. The dynamic
program therefore uses O(n2m) space.
M is computed as follows:
M [0, ·, ·] = M [·, 0, ·] = M [·, ·, 0] = 0,
M [x, y, z] =
M [x− 1, y, z], |Cx| > z,max(|Cx|+M[x− 1, y − 1, z − |Cx|], M[x− 1, y, z]), |Cx| ≤ z.
Let r = tmax−|RU (v)| be the remaining number of vulnerable nodes va may connect to without
forming a unique targeted region. Then, the algorithm picks two solutions at, av from M defined
as:
at = max
0≤j≤m
{M [m, j, r]− j · α}
av = max
0≤j≤m
{M [m, j, r − 1]− j · α}
Let At,Av ⊆ {C1, . . . , Cm} be the corresponding subsets to the solutions at, av, which can be
constructed by tracking the predecessor of a field in M .
Hence, at is the maximum benefit we gain by connecting to |At| ≤ r additional nodes, av
is the maximum benefit with at most |Av| < r additional nodes. Thus, by using At for the
solution, va might become part of a vulnerable region of maximum size and the best response
algorithm has to decide later, whether it is beneficial to risk being attacked. By taking Av, the
vulnerable region of va will remain strictly smaller than tmax and thus va won’t be targeted by
the adversary.
The algorithm has to store both solutions to decide later, which one is better, as the addi-
tional risk has influence on the total utility of the player.
If at ≤ 0 and av ≤ 0, then the best response of node va does not include edges to components
in CU under the condition that va does not immunize.
We omit the straightforward correctness proof.
3.4.2 GreedySelect: Greedy Subset Selection of CU
If va immunizes, she does not incur any risk by buying new edges into components from CU .
Thus, by Lemma 1 she can buy single edges to all components C ∈ CU \ Cinc which contribute
more to her expected profit than the edge cost α.
Therefore the GreedySelect algorithm computes the set Ag which is the set of vulnerable
components player va buys an edge to if she immunizes:
Ag = {C ∈ CU \ Cinc | |C| · psurvive(C) > α}
psurvive(c) = 1− |C ∩ T ||T | .
We omit the straightforward correctness proof.
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3.5 Partner Selection for Components in CI
Let C1, . . . , Cc ∈ CI be the components va might buy edges into. By definition, each of those
components contains at least one immunized node. Lemma 5 (see Section 3.5.3) ensures that
we only need to consider buying edges to immunized nodes.
For computing an optimal partner set for a component C ∈ CI , we consider the expected
contribution of C to va’s profit given that va buys edges to all nodes in a set ∆, and denote this
profit by uˆva(C | ∆). The details of uˆ are defined in Section 3.3.1.
3.5.1 PartnerSetSelect
For each component C ∈ CI we compute three candidate sets of players to buy edges to and
finally select the candidate set that yields the highest profit contribution for the considered
component C for player va. The three candidate sets for component C are obtained as follows:
Case 1: The player considers buying no additional edges into component C. In this case
the resulting player set is empty.
Case 2: The player considers buying exactly one additional edge into component C. The
resulting player set contains the immunized partner that maximizes the profit for this compo-
nent.
Case 3: The player considers buying at least two edges. In this case an optimal set of at
least two immunized partners is obtained using the algorithm MetaTreeSelect.
As all possible cases are covered, the most profitable set of those three candidate solutions
for component C must be the optimal partner set for component C. This optimal partner set
is returned. We refer to this subroutine as PartnerSetSelect.
The first two cases, buying either no or exactly one edge into component C are easily solved:
if no edge is purchased by va, then the expected profit contribution is uˆva(C | ∅). If exactly one
edge is bought then the expected profit contribution is uˆva(C | {w}), where w is the vertex in
C which maximizes va’s expected profit for component C.
Case 3 is much more difficult to handle. It is the main point where we need to employ
algorithmic techniques to avoid a combinatorial explosion. To ease the strategy selection, for
each component C ∈ CI we create an auxiliary graph to identify sets of nodes which offer
equivalent benefits with respect to connection. This graph is a bipartite tree which we call
the Meta Tree of C. Fig. 2 shows a conversion of a graph component into its Meta Tree by
merging adjacent nodes of the same type into regions and collapsing regions into blocks. So
called Bridge Blocks (orange) of the Meta Tree represent targeted regions of C that would, if
destroyed, decompose C into at least two components. If the adversary however chooses to
attack a player in a so-called Candidate Block (blue or violet), C would remain connected. The
construction procedure can be found in Section 3.5.2 and useful properties of the Meta Tree are
proven in Section 3.5.3.
vulnerable targeted mixed immunized
Figure 2: A graph component (left), the corresponding Meta Graph (middle), which is an
intermediate step in the construction, and the obtained Meta Tree (right).
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We now use the Meta Tree to identify the strategy maximizing the expected profit for va.
3.5.2 Meta Tree Construction
We now describe the algorithm MetaTreeConstruct for constructing the Meta Tree of com-
ponent C.
To construct the Meta Tree, we first create the Meta Graph of C by merging maximally
connected subcomponents of C ∩ U and C ∩ I, respectively. Thus, the resulting undirected
Meta Graph G′ = (V ′, E′) is bipartite with V ′ = RCU ∪ RCI , RCU = {R ∈ RU | R ⊆ C},
RCI = {R ∈ RI | R ⊆ C} and E′ = {{RU , RI} ∈ RCU ×RCI | ∃vU ∈ RU , vI ∈ RI : {vU , vI} ∈ E}.
To create the Meta Tree from the Meta Graph, we identify vertices in G′ that disconnect
the Meta Graph (and thus, the original graph) if the adversary attacks any player inside the
region represented by these vertices. We name these vertices Bridge Blocks (BB). Regions that
stay connected no matter which player the adversary targets are collapsed into so called Can-
didate Blocks (CB), to which the active player might buy edges. Those blocks are constructed
iteratively:
(1) We create a new Candidate Block CBx by identifying any immunized region RI ∈ RCI
which is not yet part of a Candidate Block: CBx = {RI} with RI ∈ RCI and RI is not yet part
of a block.
(2) We add all immunized regions R that are reachable via two paths originating from any
R′ ∈ CBx, which do not share a targeted region:
CBx = CBx ∪ {R ∈ RCI | ∃R′ ∈ CBx ∃P = R′ → R,
Q = R′ → R : (P ∩Q) ∩RT = ∅},
where R′ → R denotes a simple path from vertex R′ to vertex R. Note that the paths can be
identical, thus two immunized regions that are connected through a vulnerable but not targeted
region are collapsed as well.
(3) We add any nodes that only connect to nodes already in CBx: CBx = CBx ∪ {RU ∈
RCU | ∀{RU , R} ∈ E′ : R ∈ CBx}. This especially merges any non-targeted vulnerable regions
into the respective adjacent Candidate Block.3
After we have constructed all Candidate Blocks, i.e. when all immunized nodes are part of
a Candidate Block, any remaining nodes become Bridge Blocks BBx.
Again, if an edge existed between two nodes that are now in separate blocks, these blocks
are connected in the Meta Tree M = (V ∗, E∗) with
V ∗ = {CB1, ..., CBi, BB1, ..., BBj}
and
E∗ = {{BBx, CBy} | ∃{RU , RI} ∈ E′ : RU ∈ BBx ∧RI ∈ CBy}.
Since the underlying Meta Graph is bipartite and no additional edges are introduced, the Meta
Tree is also bipartite.
Lemma 3. The Meta Tree M is indeed a tree.
Proof. Our algorithm starts on a graph which is connected and only collapses nodes. This way
no node can get disconnected as edges are only removed when the nodes they connected are
merged. M is therefore connected.
We now use the fact that M is bipartite by construction to prove by contradiction that
M contains no cycles. Assume there exists a cycle in the Meta Tree. As M is bipartite, the
3Note that there is always exactly one adjacent Candidate Block.
12
cycle must have an even length > 2, as we allow no multi-edges. Thus the cycle contains at
least two Candidate Blocks CB1 6= CB2. These two blocks contain two immunized regions
RI ∈ CB1, R′I ∈ CB2. As they are arranged in a cycle, there exist two paths P = RI →
R′I , Q = RI → R′I that do not share a targeted region, thus according to the construction RI
and R′I must be part of the same Candidate Block. This contradicts CB1 6= CB2.
Lemma 4. After the construction of the Meta Tree all leaves are Candidate Blocks.
Proof. Assume the contrary. Then there exists a Bridge Block leaf BB. Because the Meta Tree
is a bipartite tree and the underlying Meta Graph contains at least one immunized region, the
parent of this leaf has to be a Candidate Block CB 6= BB. Then BB is only connected to
exactly one Candidate Block and must by construction be merged into CB. Then however BB
would not be a leaf which is a contradiction, thus all leaves are Candidate Blocks.
3.5.3 Key Properties of Using the Meta Tree
Lemma 5. Player va has an optimal partner set for C ∈ CI which only buys edges to immunized
players.
Proof. Consider a best response for component C ∈ CI for player va which contains buying an
edge to some vulnerable node vU ∈ C. Since C ∈ CI , at least one immunized node vI must be
adjacent to vU ’s vulnerable region RU (vU ).
On the one hand, if RU (vU ) is attacked, then player va gets no benefit from buying the
edge to vU . Buying an edge to vI instead, would yield at least the same benefit. On the other
hand, if any other component Cw ∈ RT \ RU (va) is attacked, then the vertices vU and vI stay
connected and thus an edge to vI provides the same benefit as an edge to vU .
Hence, each edge to some vulnerable player vU can be exchanged with an edge to an immu-
nized player vI that is adjacent to RU (vU ) without decreasing the expected profit.
We show that in case of buying at least two edges into C ∈ CI , player va only has to consider
leaves of the Meta Tree of C as endpoints. Remember that all vertices of the Meta Tree are
either Candidate Blocks or Bridge Blocks and that by Lemma 4, all leaves of the Meta Tree are
Candidate Blocks. Since Candidate Blocks may contain many nodes, we first have to clarify
what it means to buy an edge to a Candidate Block. We show that if a player wants to buy an
edge into a Candidate Block, then buying a single edge to an immunized node of the Candidate
Block suffices.
Lemma 6. It is never beneficial to buy more than one edge into a Candidate Block.
Proof. By Lemma 5, it suffices to buy edges to immunized nodes of the Candidate Block. For
any pair of immunized nodes vI , v′I in the Candidate Block, one of the following statements,
directly resulting from properties of the Meta Tree, will always be true:
1. There exists a direct edge or a path only containing immunized nodes between vI and v′I .
2. For any targeted region R in the Candidate Block there exists a path connecting vI and
v′I which does not contain R.
Thus, no matter which node will be attacked, each immunized node in the Candidate Block will
always be connected to the whole Candidate Block except for the nodes that get killed by the
attack. It follows, that buying at most one edge per Candidate Block suffices.
Now we are ready to show that it is optimal to buy edges towards Candidate Blocks which are
leaves of the Meta Tree.
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Lemma 7. Let M be the Meta Tree of component C. If player va has an optimal partner set
for component C which contains buying at least two edges, then va also has an optimal partner
set for component C which contains only leaves of M .
Proof. By Lemma 5 w.l.o.g. va only buys edges to Candidate Blocks in M . Assume the best
response strategy s∗a of va connects to M with at least two edges with at least one of the
endpoints not being a leaf of the Meta Tree. Let CB be such an inner block, root the Meta
Tree at CB and inspect its subtrees.
If va bought edges to at least two different subtrees, one of those edges will be connected
to CB no matter where the adversary attacks. Thus, by dropping the edge to CB the player
does not reduce connectivity whilst decreasing her expenses, which is a contradiction to the
assumption that the edge to CB is part of a best response.
If however va only bought edges to one of the subtrees of CB, va can exchange the edge to
CB with an edge to a leaf CB′ in another subtree Due to Lemma 4 this leaf is a Candidate
Block as well. Again, independent of the attack target of the adversary, va is connected to CB
through one of the subtrees she bought an edge to, hence the exchange does not decrease her
utility.
Hence, each edge to some inner block CB can be exchanged with an edge to a leaf block
CB′ without decreasing the expected profit.
3.5.4 Solving Case 3 of PartnerSetSelect
In the following let M be the Meta Tree of component C. Moreover, we assume that M has at
least two Candidate Blocks, since otherwise, by Lemma 5 (see Section 3.5.3), buying at most
one edge suffices.
Idea of the MetaTreeSelect Algorithm By Lemma 6 and Lemma 7 (see Section 3.5.3)
we only have to consider to buy single edges into leaves of the Meta Tree which are Candidate
Blocks. Thus, we only have to find the optimal combination of leaves of M to which to buy an
edge.
Probing edge purchases to all possible combinations of leaves of M and comparing the
expected profit contributions yields a correct solution but entails exponentially many computa-
tions. We reduce this exponential complexity by using the following observations to obtain the
best possible combination of leaves. Both observations are based on the assumption that player
va buys an edge to some leaf r of M and we consider the tree M rooted at r. Later we ensure
this assumption by rooting M at each possible leaf.
Observation 1: Consider any vertex w of M . If player va has an edge to w, then it can be
decided efficiently whether it is beneficial to buy exactly one or no edge into a subtree of w, as
the influence of any additional edges into M does not propagate over w, effectively making the
decisions to buy edges independent for subtrees.
Observation 2: Let w be any vertex of M and let the children of w in M be x1, . . . , x`.
Consider that va has an edge to w and it has already been decided for each subtree rooted at
x1, . . . , x` whether or not to buy an edge into that subtree. If there exists at least one edge
between va and any of those subtrees, then it cannot be beneficial to buy additional edges into
the subtree rooted at w. Either w is destroyed, and the previous edge-buy decisions apply to
the disconnected subtrees, or w survives, and va is connected to all subtrees via node w.
These observations provide us with the foundation for a dynamic programming algorithm
which decides bottom-up whether it is beneficial to buy at most one edge into a given subtree
by reusing the edge buy decisions of its subtrees.
Note that the algorithm never has to compare combinations of bought edges, as the only
decision to make is, whether or not to buy exactly one edge into a subtree in combination with
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iteratively shifting the presumed edge to the parent node of the leaves to the root r.
The MetaTreeSelect Algorithm A detailed description of the MetaTreeSelect algo-
rithm can be found in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3: MetaTreeSelect(M)
Input: Meta Tree M for component C
Output: Player va’s optimal partner set for C consisting of at least two partners
1 foreach leaf r of M do
2 M(r)← root M at vertex r;
3 w ← r’s only child in M(r);
4 opt(r)← {some immunized node in r} ∪ RootedMetaTreeSelect(M(r), w);
5 best← opt(r) which maximizes uˆva(C | opt(r));
6 if |best| ≥ 2 then
7 return best;
8 else
9 return ∅;
The algorithm MetatreeSelect roots M at every leaf and assumes buying an edge towards
some immunized node within the root Candidate Block. Then the subroutine RootedMeta-
TreeSelect (see Algorithm 4) gets the rooted Meta Tree M(r) and some vertex rT (which
initially is the only child of the currently considered root leaf) as input and recursively com-
putes the expected profit contribution of one additional edge from va to a block in the subtree
T rooted at rT under the assumption that va is already connected to the parent block p(rT ) of
rT in M(r).
Algorithm 4: RootedMetaTreeSelect(M(r), rT )
Input: rooted Meta Tree M(r), vertex rT of M(r)
Output: Set of nodes from T to buy an edge to
1 opt(rT )← ∅;
2 foreach child w of rT do
3 opt(rT )← opt(rT ) ∪ RootedMetaTreeSelect(M(r), w);
4 if rT is a Bridge Block or opt(rT ) 6= ∅ or a player in T bought an edge to va
then
5 return opt(rT );
6 foreach leaf l of T do
7 profit(l)← additional profit of va with edge to l;
8 best← l which maximizes profit(l);
9 if profit(best) > α then
10 opt(rT )← opt(rT ) ∪ {some immunized node in best};
11 return opt(rT );
Let |T | denote the number of players represented by the union of all blocks in T and opt(rT )
will be the set of blocks in T the algorithm decided to buy an edge to.
After processing all subtrees of rT (Alg. 4 lines 2-3), the algorithm distinguishes three cases
(Alg. 4 line 4):
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Case 1: rT is a Bridge Block. Then, as M is bipartite, p(rT ) must be a Candidate Block.
As the algorithm assumes the existence of an edge from va to p(rT ), there also exists a path
from va to rT via p(rT ) in all attack scenarios. Thus, no additional edge is needed (Alg.4 line
5).
Case 2: There exists an edge between va and some node x in T , either through an edge va
buys according to the results of the recursive invocations, or through a preexisting edge bought
by player x. Then, depending on the attack target, there either exists a path from va to rT via
x or via p(rT ). Hence, no additional edge is needed (Alg.4 line 5).
Case 3: Player va can get disconnected from rT by an attack on p(rT ). Then the algorithm
considers each leaf l of T as possible partner (Alg.4 line 6), computes the profit contribution of
an edge to l (Alg.4 line 7) and selects a leaf that maximizes this profit contribution (Alg.4 line
8).
The additional profit of an edge to l is computed as follows: An edge to l only yields profit,
if a Bridge Block t is attacked which either belongs to T or t = p(rT ), and l is located in a
subtree of t. In this case, the profit contribution equals the size of this subtree. Therefore let
profit(l | t) be the additional profit an edge to l contributes to the utility of va in case t is
attacked and let B be the set of all Bridge Blocks in T . Thus
profit(l) =
|p(rT )|
|T | |T |+
∑
t∈B
|t|
|T |profit(l | t),
with
profit(l | t) =
{
0 l is not in any subtree of t
|Y | Y is a subtree of t and l is in Y.
Finally, If the additional profit of the best possible leaf exceeds the edge costs, l is added to the
set of partners of va (Alg.4 line 10).
3.5.5 Correctness of MetaTreeSelect and RootedMetaTreeSelect
An important detail for proving the correctness of MetaTreeSelect is the definition of
profit(l) from Case 3 of RootedMetaTreeSelect. There, the existence of an edge to p(rT )
is assumed and the expected profit is computed by considering both the case where p(rT ) is
destroyed and the case where some other node is attacked. Thus, while considering an assumed
edge to some parent node, it is already taken into account that this node may be attacked.
Also note that if an edge to some node of the Meta Tree is bought then this means that an
edge to some immunized node of the corresponding Candidate Block is bought.
The algorithm MetaTreeSelect computes an optimal partner set for component C con-
taining at least two nodes, if it exists. In this case, by Lemma 7, there is an optimal partner set
for C containing only nodes within leaves of M . Assume that the Meta Tree M of component
C is rooted at such a leaf r. Since the algorithm MetaTreeSelect compares all possibilities
to root M at a leaf we will assume in the following that some node r∗ in block r is contained in
an optimal partner set.
Fig. 3 shows the structure of the Meta Tree in the following proofs.
Lemma 8. Consider any subtree T with height h of M and let a be its root. If RootedMeta-
TreeSelect has processed all subtrees T1, T2, . . . of a under the assumption of an edge from va
to a and at least one of those subtrees contains a node which was added to the partner set, then
it cannot be profitable to buy additional edges into the complete tree T under the assumption of
the existence of an edge to p(a).
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Figure 3: Inductive step of RootedMetaTreeSelect.
Proof. We prove the statement by induction over the height h. Assume there exists at least one
edge between va and some child a
′ of a and assume the existence of an edge to p(a), the parent
of a. Thus, there exists a path from va to a via p(a).
For h = 1 all children of a are leaves. The event of a being destroyed was already considered
in a previous recursive call. If some other node is attacked, then all surviving nodes in T remain
connected and va has a path via some node in a
′ to all of them.
Assume now, that the hypothesis holds for some arbitrary fixed height h0 ≥ 1. For h = h0+1
we distinguish two different attack targets of the adversary.
If the attack takes place outside T , then T remains connected and analogous to above va is
connected to all survivors via a′.
If the adversary attacks a player inside T , then va is connected to a via p(a) which is
equivalent to va having a direct edge to a and thus, by induction hypothesis, no additional edge
should be bought into any subtree of a.
The next statements establish that we can treat all subtrees of a node of M independently,
that buying one edge into a subtree suffices if the edge-buy decision was negative for all subtrees
one level below and that RootedMetaTreeSelect is correct.
Lemma 9. Assume the existence of an edge from va to some node a of M and let V1, . . . , Vz
denote the node sets of a’s subtrees.
If there are optimal partner sets O1, . . . , Oz for C which all contain r
∗, then there is an
optimal partner set O∗ for C containing r∗ where O∗ ∩ Vj = Oj ∩ Vj for all 1 ≤ j ≤ z.
Proof. The choice of nodes to connect to within any subtree T of a does not influence va’s
connectivity to nodes outside of T as every path from some node in T to some node outside T
traverses node a. Thus, the choice of nodes in T for all optimal partner sets for C is independent
from the choice of nodes in other subtrees.
Lemma 10. Consider any subtree T with root a of M . If RootedMetaTreeSelect has
correctly decided that no edge should be bought into any subtree of a, then every optimal partner
set for component C which contains r∗ has at most one node from within T .
Proof. By induction over height h of T . For h = 0 the block a must be a leaf of the Meta Tree.
By Lemma 4 and Lemma 6 the statement follows.
Assume now, that the hypothesis holds for some height h0 ≥ 0. For h = h0 + 1 we assume
the existence of an edge between va and p(a) and distinguish two different attack targets of the
adversary:
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If the attack takes place outside of T , then T remains connected and thus at most one edge
into T suffices.
If a node within T is attacked, then va is connected to a via p(a) which is equivalent to va
having a direct edge to a, which is the assumption under which RootedMetaTreeSelect
has correctly decided not to buy edges into any subtree of a.
Lemma 11. If va has an edge to p(rT ) and opt(rT ) is returned by RootedMetaTree-
Select(M(r), rT ), then there exists an optimal partner set for component C which contains r
∗
and opt(rT ).
Proof. RootedMetaTreeSelect recurses on all subtrees of rT .
If rT is a leaf of M(r), then the algorithm computes the expected profit contribution of
buying a single edge into the leaf and if this exceeds α an immunized node within this leaf is
eventually added to opt(rT ). Since, by Lemma 4, leaves are Candidate Blocks, buying at most
one edge is correct and the algorithm compares both possible options. Otherwise, if rT is not a
leaf, then there are three cases:
Case 1: If rT is a Bridge Block, then p(rT ) must be a Candidate Block and by assumption
va is connected to rT via p(rT ). Thus, by Lemma 9, there is an optimal partner set for C which
contains r∗ and the union of all the returned node sets obtained by recursing on all children of
rT .
Case 2: If there exists an edge between va and any node in the subtree rooted at rT . Then,
by Lemma 8 and Lemma 9, there is an optimal partner set for C which contains r∗ and the
union of all the returned node sets obtained by recursing on all children of rT .
Case 3: If opt(rT ) = ∅ after all children of rT were processed. Then, by Lemma 10, it is
optimal to consider buying at most one edge into the subtree rooted at rT . RootedMetaTree-
Select tries all possibilities and selects the most profitable one.
Finally, we show that MetaTreeSelect is correct.
Theorem 2. If there is an optimal partner set with at least two nodes for component C, then
MetaTreeSelect algorithm outputs such a set.
Proof. Assume that there exists an optimal partner set with at least two nodes for component C
and assume that the Meta Tree M of component C is rooted at some leaf r. Since the algorithm
compares all possibilities to root M at a leaf and by Lemma 7, at least one of those leaves must
be contained in an optimal partner set. Assume that r is indeed such a leaf.
Thus, by buying r we satisfy the assumption needed for RootedMetaTreeSelect. By
Lemma 11, RootedMetaTreeSelect returns a set of nodes, which together with r∗ yields
an optimal partner set for C. Hence, the algorithm MetaTreeSelect is correct.
3.6 Cost Analysis
We now prove that our algorithm is efficient.
Theorem 3. BestResponseComputation runs in time O(n4 + k5), where n is the number
of nodes in the network and k is the number of blocks in the largest occurring Meta Tree. Only
in terms of n, the run time is in O(n5).
of Theorem 3. We start with analyzing the five core subroutines of our algorithm: SubsetS-
elect, GreedySelect, PartnerSetSelect, MetaTreeConstruct and MetaTreeSe-
lect.
SubsetSelect: This subroutine calculates a three dimensional matrix where every dimen-
sion has a maximum length of n. The calculations needed for one matrix entry can be done in
constant time. This results in a time complexity of O(n3).
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GreedySelect: Every single component of CU is tested individually if an edge into it is
beneficial. For the calculation of the expected profit contribution only the size of the component
is needed. Thus, this task can be done for all components in O(n).
PartnerSetSelect: This subroutine is executed for every component C ∈ CI . Let p
denote the number of nodes of any processed component C ∈ CI and let q denote its number of
edges. The algorithm covers three cases:
Case 1: No edge is bought into C: Here an attack is simulated on every targeted node y in
component C and the remaining profit is calculated. Calculating the profit after an attack on
node y can be done in linear time O(p + q) using breadth first search (BFS). Since there are
O(p) many targeted nodes in C the overall cost is in O(p(p + q)). In the worst case this is in
O(p3).
Case 2: One edge is bought into C: The profit of every combination of buying an edge to
node x in C and having node y in C attacked is calculated. This amounts to a total cost of
O(p2(p+ q)), which is in O(p4).
Case 3: Two or more edges are bought into C: In this case MetaTreeConstruct and
MetaTreeSelect are executed.
• MetaTreeConstruct: To construct the Meta Tree we first create the Meta Graph of
C. To do so we use BFS from an uncollapsed node to find all adjacent nodes of the same
types. All of these nodes are then merged and disregarded in further iterations of BFS.
There may be O(p) calls to BFS and (assuming a representation as adjacency list) merging
neighboring nodes of the same type can be done in O(p + q). Thus the construction of
the Meta Graph happens in O(p(p+ q)) which is in O(p3).
The construction of the Meta Tree consists of two steps: Finding cycles to collapse and
collapsing the nodes on the cycle. The first part can be done using BFS and in every
iteration of BFS at least one node is collapsed. Thus, the overall cost for all BFS com-
putations is in O(p(p + q)). The second part can be done by checking the edges of all
neighboring nodes. This can be done in O(p+ q) time per merge. Hence we have a total
cost of O(p(p+ q)) which is in O(p3) for the construction of the Meta Tree.
• MetaTreeSelect: Let k denote the number of nodes of the created Meta Tree. The
MetaTreeSelect algorithm calculates the expected profit contribution for connecting
with the currently considered component via two or more edges. It roots the Meta Tree at
every leaf, and then traverses it bottom up. During this traversal the following calculation
is made at every node: The number of reachable nodes from a node x given an attack on
node y is evaluated for every possible node pair x, y of the Meta Tree. As seen above this
cannot exceed a run time of O(k3). As this is done for every node for every possible root,
the total cost is in O(k5).
Thus Case 3 has total cost in O(p3 + k5). It follows that the total cost of PartnerSetSelect
can be upper bounded by O(p4 + k5).
PossibleStrategy: First, an arbitrary node for every previously selected vulnerable com-
ponent is chosen. This can be done in constant time per component. Adding the corresponding
edges and updating immunized, vulnerable and targeted regions can be done via at most n
BFS computations and thus in O(n3). Next, PartnerSetSelect is called for each of the c
components in CI . Let pj and kj denote the number of nodes and the size of the Meta Tree for
component Cj ∈ CI for 1 ≤ j ≤ c. Therefore, the cost of PossibleStrategy can be upper
bounded by O(n3 +∑1≤j≤c(p4j + k5j )) which is in O(n4 + k5).
BestResponseComputation: The total cost for BestResponseComputation thus is in
O(n3 + n+ n3 + n4 + k5) = O(n4 + k5). Since k < n this yields cost in O(n5).
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3.7 Empirical Results
To evaluate our proposed best response algorithm, we apply it to randomly generated networks.
To allow a direct comparison with the extensive experiments by Goyal et al. [13, 14], we chose
the same setup, i.e. the initial networks were generated via the Erdo˝s-Renyi model with average
degree 5 and α = β = 2.
In Fig. 4 (left) we show the number of rounds required until the best response dynamic
arrives at a Nash equilibrium averaged over 100 experiments per configuration. Here a round
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Figure 4: Number of iterations until convergence (top); average welfare at non-trivial equilibria
(middle) α = β = 2. Bottom: Meta Tree size with respect to immunization density.
consists of a best response strategy update by every player in some fixed order. In contrast with
the results in [13, 14], where much weaker strategy updates called swapstable best response have
been used, our experiments indicate a speed-up of 50% by updating to best possible strategies.
Fig. 4 (middle) plots the welfare of networks at (non-trivial) equilibria over the population
size achieved by performing best response dynamics with the initial setting as described above.
For every configuration a random sample from the 100 independent experiments was chosen.
We observe that the achieved global welfare is quite close to the optimal value of n(n−α) which
indicates that best response dynamics yield favorable outcomes whenever they converge to a
Nash equilibrium4.
The run time for computing the partial best response strategy for attaching to connected
components from CI , as described in Section 3.5, heavily depends on the number of Candidate
Blocks in the resulting Meta Tree for the component. To illustrate the benefits of using the Meta
Tree as a preprocessing step, we compared the number of nodes of a random connected network
and the number of Candidate Blocks in the corresponding Meta Tree, varying the fraction of
immunized players in the initial network. For each experiment we used connected Gn,m random
networks with n = 1000 and m = 2n edges.
The results are depicted in Fig. 4 (right). There the number of Candidate Blocks of the Meta
Tree over the fraction of immunized players averaged over 100 runs per parameter combination
is shown. As expected, the number of Candidate Blocks in the Meta Tree shrinks rapidly as the
fraction of immunized vertices in the initial network increases. We also note that the maximum
number of Candidate Blocks in the Meta Tree is roughly 10% of the number of nodes in the
initial network.
We illustrate the behavior of best response dynamics with Fig. 5, where snapshots from
a sample run are shown. The initial network is sparsely connected with n/2 = 25 edges and
contains no immunized players. During the first round, a player with a sufficient number of
4Note that this property is not guaranteed, since Goyal et al. [14] present a best response cycle, that is, a
configuration where a sequence of best response strategy updates returns to the initial network and may thus
never converge.
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incident edges bought by other players decides to obtain immunization. Then all following
players choose to connect to this newly immunized hub. The subsequent rounds distribute
players away from the newly formed targeted regions until an equilibrium is achieved after four
rounds.
Figure 5: A sample run of the best response dynamic (n = 50, α = β = 2).
Initial state. After round 1. After round 2. After round 3. After round 4.
4 Random Attack Adversary
In the following we will consider the random attack adversary [14] which is a less predictable
adversary compared to the maximum carnage adversary.
The Modified Model and its Implications The random attack adversary attacks one
vulnerable node uniformly at random, i.e. with probability 1|U| per player in U . Facing this
adversary, the probability for a vulnerable player vU to be destroyed increases linearly with the
size of player vU ’s vulnerable region RU (vU ). Moreover, every vulnerable player belongs to the
set of targeted vertices, that is, T = U .
Clearly, the behavior of the chosen adversary influences the utility of a player’s strategy
heavily. Thus, it is not at all clear that our algorithm for computing a utility maximizing
strategy for the maximum carnage adversary can be adapted to the random attack adversary.
We now show that this can actually be done with only some minor adjustments. Thereby we
increase the run time slightly, but our algorithm is still efficient.
Adaptation of our Algorithm With the deterministic maximum carnage adversary, a player
was either risk-free or potentially targeted with probability 1|T | . Introducing the random attack
adversary results in up to n different probabilities for the player va to be destroyed due to
different possible sizes of targeted regions.
Note that none of the subroutines GreedySelect, MetaTreeConstruct and Meta-
TreeSelect depend on tmax, but are only formulated in terms of T and RT . Even though
these sets change in comparison to the maximum carnage adversary, correctness still holds for
those parts of the algorithm. In particular, the Meta Tree still fulfills the same properties
as before, even though the number of Bridge Blocks increases for many input graphs, as all
vulnerable regions are targeted regions now (see Fig. 6).
Thus, only the subroutine SubsetSelect has to be adjusted.
SubsetSelect for the Random Attack Adversary With the random attack adversary the
maximum expected profit generated by all possible sizes of the vulnerable region of va need to be
considered. A larger region might lower the overall profit as it increases the attack probability
on the vulnerable region of va. Instead of two sets of selected components Av,At, we now need
to consider up to n sets that maximize the profit for each possible size of RU .
As before, the interdependent subset selection on CU \ Cinc with |CU \ Cinc| = m fills the
matrix M . In the end, the plane M [m, ·, ·] contains all possible numbers of players from these
components that va can buy edges to. These values constitute all possible sizes of RU (v). There
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vulnerable targeted mixed immunized
Figure 6: A graph component (left) and its Meta Graph (middle) and Meta Tree (right) for the
random attack adversary.
might be different subsets of CU \Cinc that result in the same size of the active player’s vulnerable
region. Observe that the maximum utility is always achieved with the subset that uses the least
amount of edges.
So for every row M [m, ·, z] the algorithm selects the minimum y so that M [m, y, z] = z.
This can be done in O(n2) and yields a maximum of n values. We call this modified version
UniformSubsetSelect.
BestResponseComputation for the Random Attack Adversary The modified main
algorithm can be found in Algorithm 5.
The only change compared to the maximum carnage adversary is that for each of the O(n)
solutions of UniformSubsetSelect the subroutine PossibleStrategy is executed. This
yields an overall run time of O(n3 + n(n4 + k5)) = O(n5 + nk5), which is in O(n6).
Observe that we calculate best responses for all possible sizes of RU (va), and T remains
unchanged across all cases.
Algorithm 5: BestResponseComputation for the random attack adversary.
Input: Strategies s = (s1, . . . , sn), active player va, 1 ≤ a ≤ n
Output: Best response strategy of player va denoted by sa = (xa, ya)
1 s∅ = (∅, 0);
2 Let G(s′) be the induced game state with s′ = (s1, . . . , sa−1, s∅, sa+1, . . . , sn);
3 Let A be the solutions of UniformSubsetSelect on CU ;
4 Let Ag be the solution of GreedySelect on CU ;
5 Sv = {PossibleStrategy(A, 0) | A ∈ A};
6 sg = PossibleStrategy(Ag, 1);
7 S = {s∅, sg} ∪ Sv;
8 return strategy s ∈ S which maximizes va’s utility;
5 Conclusion
For most models of strategic network formation computing a utility maximizing strategy is
known to be NP-hard. In this paper, we have proven that the model by Goyal et al. [13, 14]
is a notable exception to this rule. The presented efficient algorithm for computing a best
response for a player circumvents a combinatorial explosion essentially by simplifying the given
network and thereby making it amenable to a dynamic programming approach. An efficient best
response computation is the key ingredient for using the model in large scale simulations and
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for analyzing real world networks. Moreover, our algorithm can be adapted to a significantly
stronger adversary and we are confident that further modifications for coping with other variants
of the model are possible.
Future Work Settling the complexity of computing a best response strategy with respect to
the maximum disruption adversary is left as an open problem. Besides this, it seems worthwhile
to consider a variant with directed edges, originally introduced by Bala & Goyal [2]. Directed
edges would more accurately model the differences in risk and benefit which depend on the flow
direction. Using the analogy of the WWW, a user who downloads information benefits from it,
but also risks getting infected. In contrast, the user providing the information is exposed to little
or no risk. Moreover, a constant cost for immunization seems unrealistic. In reality a highly
connected node would have to invest much more into security measures than any node with
only a few connections. Thus, it would be interesting to consider a version where immunization
costs scale with the degree of a node. We believe that this variant of the model yields more
diverse optimal networks and also a greater variety of equilibria.
References
[1] J. Aspnes, K. Chang, and A. Yampolskiy. Inoculation strategies for victims of viruses
and the sum-of-squares partition problem. Journal of Computer and System Sciences,
72(6):1077–1093, 2006.
[2] V. Bala and S. Goyal. A Noncooperative Model of Network Formation. Econometrica,
68(5):1181–1229, 2000.
[3] V. Bala and S. Goyal. A strategic analysis of network reliability. In Networks and Groups,
pages 313–336. Springer, 2003.
[4] D. Bilo`, L. Guala`, S. Leucci, and G. Proietti. Locality-based network creation games. In
SPAA’14, pages 277–286, 2014.
[5] D. Bilo`, L. Guala`, and G. Proietti. Bounded-distance network creation games. ACM TEAC,
3(3):16:1–16:20, 2015.
[6] A. Chauhan, P. Lenzner, A. Melnichenko, and M. Mu¨nn. On selfish creation of robust
networks. In SAGT’16, pages 141–152, 2016.
[7] P.-A. Chen, M. David, and D. Kempe. Better vaccination strategies for better people. In
EC’10, pages 179–188. ACM, 2010.
[8] A. Cord-Landwehr and P. Lenzner. Network creation games: Think global - act local. In
MFCS’15, pages 248–260, 2015.
[9] R. G. Downey and M. R. Fellows. Fundamentals of Parameterized Complexity. Texts in
Computer Science. Springer, 2013.
[10] S. Ehsani, S. S. Fadaee, M. Fazli, A. Mehrabian, S. S. Sadeghabad, M. A. Safari, and
M. Saghafian. A bounded budget network creation game. ACM Transactions on Algorithms,
11(4):34, 2015.
[11] A. Fabrikant, A. Luthra, E. N. Maneva, C. H. Papadimitriou, and S. Shenker. On a network
creation game. In PODC’03, pages 347–351.
23
[12] T. Friedrich, S. Ihde, C. Keßler, P. Lenzner, S. Neubert, and D. Schumann. Brief announce-
ment: Efficient best response computation for strategic network formation under attack.
In SPAA’17, to appear.
[13] S. Goyal, S. Jabbari, M. Kearns, S. Khanna, and J. Morgenstern. Strategic Network
Formation with Attack and Immunization. arXiv preprint arXiv:1511.05196, 2015.
[14] S. Goyal, S. Jabbari, M. Kearns, S. Khanna, and J. Morgenstern. Strategic network for-
mation with attack and immunization. In WINE’16, pages 429–443, 2016.
[15] M. O. Jackson and A. Wolinsky. A strategic model of social and economic networks. Journal
of economic theory, 71(1):44–74, 1996.
[16] B. Kawald and P. Lenzner. On dynamics in selfish network creation. In SPAA’13, pages
83–92. ACM, 2013.
[17] L. Kliemann. The price of anarchy for network formation in an adversary model. Games,
2(3):302–332, 2011.
[18] V. A. Kumar, R. Rajaraman, Z. Sun, and R. Sundaram. Existence theorems and approx-
imation algorithms for generalized network security games. In ICDCS’10, pages 348–357.
IEEE, 2010.
[19] P. Lenzner. Greedy selfish network creation. In WINE’12, pages 142–155.
[20] E. A. Meirom, S. Mannor, and A. Orda. Formation games of reliable networks. In INFO-
COM’15, pages 1760–1768, 2015.
[21] M. Mihala´k and J. C. Schlegel. The price of anarchy in network creation games is (mostly)
constant. In SAGT’10, pages 276–287, 2010.
[22] C. H. Papadimitriou. Algorithms, games, and the internet. In STOC’01, pages 749–753,
2001.
[23] S. Saha, A. Adiga, and A. K. S. Vullikanti. Equilibria in epidemic containment games. In
AAAI, pages 777–783, 2014.
24
